Policy Brief: The WHO Convention on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (WHO CA+)

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Version : July 2023

In December 2021, the World Health Assembly established an Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) in response to the international community’s catastrophic failure to show solidarity and equity during the COVID-19 pandemic. The INB was tasked with drafting and negotiating a legally binding instrument, the WHO Convention, Agreement, or other International Instrument on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (WHO CA+).

The Bureau of the INB is composed of representatives from Brazil, Egypt, Japan, Netherlands, South Africa, and Thailand. These members were elected. The representatives are as follows:

  1. Brazil: Tovar da Silva Nunes
  2. Egypt: Ahmed Soliman
  3. Japan: Kazuho Taguchi
  4. Netherlands: Roland Driece
  5. South Africa: Precious Matsoso
  6. Thailand: Viroj Tangcharoensathien

Here are 2 possible reasons why these representatives were chosen:

1. The INB aims to ensure that its composition reflects the diversity of its member states, including geographical diversity. The chosen representatives ensure a broad geographical representation.

2. The individual representatives have extensive experience in international relations, health policy, and other relevant fields, making them well-suited to contribute to the work of the INB.

Potential Benefits

Equitable and Affordable Access to Health Technologies: The agreement aims to ensure equitable and affordable access to health technologies that strengthen national health systems and mitigate social inequalities. This includes the development of a database that provides details of pandemic-related products for all known pandemic potential diseases.

Waivers of Intellectual Property Rights: In the event of a pandemic, the Parties shall support time-bound waivers of intellectual property rights to accelerate or scale up the manufacturing of pandemic-related products. This is intended to increase the availability and adequacy of affordable pandemic-related products.

Co-development and Transfer of Technology and Know-how: The agreement recognizes that inequitable access to pandemic-related products should be addressed by increased manufacturing capacity that is more equitably, geographically, and strategically distributed. The Parties shall strengthen existing and develop innovative multilateral mechanisms, including through the pooling of knowledge and intellectual property.

Access and Benefit-sharing: The agreement emphasizes the need for the rapid, systematic, and timely sharing of biological materials with epidemic and pandemic potential, as well as relevant information. It also calls for the establishment of a multilateral access and benefit-sharing system for timely, effective, predictable, and equitable access to pandemic-related products.

Potential Risks

Suspension of Intellectual Property Rights: The agreement calls for time-bound waivers of intellectual property rights during a pandemic. While this is intended to increase the availability of pandemic-related products, it could potentially discourage investment in research and development due to reduced potential for profit.

Disputes Over Agreement Interpretation: The agreement contains several provisions that could be subject to different interpretations by different Parties, potentially leading to disputes. For example, the agreement calls for the “full use of the flexibilities provided in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)” but does not specify what these flexibilities are.

Financial Obligations: The agreement calls for the Parties to develop innovative multilateral mechanisms, including through the pooling of knowledge and intellectual property. However, it does not specify who will bear the costs of these mechanisms, potentially leading to disputes over financial obligations.

Sovereignty Issues: The agreement calls for the Parties to ensure equitable and timely access to health technologies, in particular in developing countries, without discrimination. This could potentially infringe on the sovereignty of individual countries, particularly if they have different views on what constitutes “equitable” access.

Unequal Distribution of Resources: While the agreement aims for equitable access to health technologies, if these are not distributed equitably, it could exacerbate inequalities, including food insecurity.


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